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I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court held—unanimously, and to
the surprise of many court watchers—that placing a GPS tracker on a vehicle to
monitor its movements on public streets is a “search” for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment.1 Jones is a true blockbuster decision, one that may ulti-
mately be deemed as significant to the law of criminal procedure as Katz v.
United States,2 which has anchored Fourth Amendment law for the past forty-
five years. In Jones, the Court announced an entirely new, independent, and
potentially widely applicable test for what constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. It also signaled its willingness to dramatically rethink and expand
the scope of the traditional Katz test in light of new surveillance technologies.
The Court’s holding was limited to the threshold question of what consti-
tutes a search;3 accordingly, the action, in thousands of pending GPS tracker
investigations around the country, will now turn to suppression, as pre-Jones
tracker evidence faces post-Jones suppression motions. Whether Jones will
result in the suppression of warrantless tracker evidence in cases pending as of
January 2012 will depend on whether exceptions to the exclusionary rule can
be found.
The question of how the exclusionary rule should apply to suppression
claims brought under Jones is an extraordinarily important one for the future of
Fourth Amendment law because it will force courts to confront the general
question of how the exclusionary rule should apply to new developments in
Fourth Amendment law. How courts answer that question will largely deter-
mine whether novel Fourth Amendment claims can be litigated at all. And the
possible answers to that question are deeply uncertain because in June 2011,
just six months before Jones, the Court decided a case, Davis v. United States,4
that may significantly restrict the reach of the exclusionary rule in cases of
changing law. Whether Davis has that effect depends on how broadly lower
courts interpret its holding, which requires courts to engage in an analysis of
the applicable appellate caselaw in a particular jurisdiction at the time of a
disputed police action.
In this Article, I set out a general framework for applying Davis to all the
possible combinations of controlling state and federal appellate caselaw that
might apply at a given time to a given search. I then show how the coming
flood of Jones litigation about pending GPS tracker investigations is the perfect
test of my reading of Davis—and, more importantly, of Davis’s impact on the
future of the Fourth Amendment.
II. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE: BACKGROUND
The exclusionary rule provides that evidence obtained by a Fourth
Amendment search carried out without a warrant will be suppressed unless an
1 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 947.
4 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
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exception applies.5 There are a number of exceptions to the rule, however.
Most prominently, if the police have probable cause, then the warrant require-
ment is excused if there are exigent circumstances.6 Furthermore, the exigent
circumstances exception applies per se to all searches of vehicles.7 So an obvi-
ous litigation tactic for the government will be to argue that GPS tracking of a
vehicle should be considered a vehicle search.8
Even if the police lack probable cause for a search, suppression is still not
automatic. There are five general exceptions to the exclusionary rule that can
apply to allow the introduction of evidence even where the police had no war-
rant, no probable cause, and no exigent circumstances or other warrant-rule
exception. The “standing” exception provides that even when the police violate
the Fourth Amendment, there will be no suppression unless the defendant’s
own rights were violated.9 The independent-source exception provides that
there will be no suppression where police obtain evidence through lawful
means as well as unlawful.10 The inevitable-discovery exception provides that
there will be no suppression where the investigation would inevitably have
turned up the evidence through lawful means (even though police actually got it
unlawfully).11 And, the “attenuation” exception provides that there will be no
suppression where there is no close causal relationship between the illegality
and the discovery of the evidence.12
The fifth exception, “good faith,” is in many ways the most important
because it kicks in when none of the others apply—in circumstances, in other
words, in which there is no claim that the search was actually legal.
In its initial incarnation, in United States v. Leon, the good-faith exception
was a rule about warrants: if a magistrate issued a warrant that was facially
valid, but was later shown to be defective (shown, for example, to lack proba-
ble cause), then evidence discovered by officers executing the warrant would
not be suppressed.13 The Supreme Court has steadily expanded the doctrine,
however, to other situations in which the police discover evidence based on a
search or arrest later shown to be unlawful. The Court first extended Leon to
cover an officer’s reasonable reliance on a state statute later held unconstitu-
tional,14 then to a mistake by a court clerk about the existence of an outstanding
5 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
648 (1961); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347–48 (1974).
6 E.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011).
7 See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991).
8 See Orin Kerr, Jones, the Automobile Exception, and the Warrant Requirement, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Feb. 2, 2012, 12:45 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/02/02/jones-the-auto-
mobile-exception-and-the-warrant-requirement/. At least one court has said this exception
does not apply. United States v. Ortiz, No. 11-251-08, 2012 WL 2951391, at *16–19 (E.D.
Pa. July 20, 2012) (holding that the vehicle exception does not apply to tracker installation).
9 See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 254–57 (2007); Minnesota v. Carter, 525
U.S. 83, 88 (1998); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978). The Court actually uses
scare quotes around “standing” to indicate that it is not Article III or prudential standing that
is at issue, but simply the application of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 133.
10 See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988).
11 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
12 See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 273–74 (1978).
13 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984).
14 Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1987).
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warrant,15 and then, finally, in Herring v. United States, to a mistake by a
police department clerk about the existence of an outstanding warrant.16
Herring, at least, was still about warrants: the holding was that when,
because of sloppy police recordkeeping, an officer arrested a suspect based on a
warrant that was no longer valid, evidence obtained during that arrest need not
be suppressed.17 In 2011, however, the Court, in Davis v. United States,
extended the doctrine into hitherto untouched territory: an officer’s reliance not
on a warrant, and not on a state statute, but rather on caselaw.18 Davis holds
that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence discovered by police con-
duct that has been expressly authorized by governing appellate caselaw.19
Jones litigation—litigation about the admissibility of pre-Jones tracker
evidence—is going to turn on the good-faith doctrine. For example, if—as in
Jones itself20—the officers lacked probable cause, neither the vehicle excep-
tion21 nor exigent circumstances22 will apply. And, in such cases—cases, for
example, where the tracker was installed largely based on a hunch,23 and the
defendant was not otherwise a target—there will be no viable, independent
source or inevitable discovery claim. In those cases—and I have no doubt that
they number in the thousands24—the suppression question will turn on the final
exception: the “good-faith” rule. Whether the lower courts indeed apply Davis
to pre-Jones GPS tracker searches will depend on the clarity of pre-Jones
appellate precedent on tracker investigations, and on the lower courts’ interpre-
tation of the scope of Davis. As it turns out, there is considerable variation in
the former25 and significant scholarly disagreement on the latter.26 In this Arti-
15 Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995).
16 Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 698, 703 (2009).
17 Id. at 703.
18 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011).
19 Id.
20 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
21 See supra text accompanying notes 7–8.
22 See supra text accompanying note 6.
23 That is to say, based on anything less than the probable cause required by Jones.
24 In the wake of Jones, the FBI deactivated approximately 3,000 GPS trackers that were
attached without warrants. See Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Ruling Prompts FBI to
Turn Off 3,000 Tracking Devices, ABC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2012, 10:40 AM), http://abcnews.go.
com/blogs/politics/2012/03/supreme-court-ruling-prompts-fbi-to-turn-off-3000-tracking-
devices/. According to FBI General Counsel Andrew Weissmann, the agency struggled with
how to retrieve many of these devices without turning them on “because now you needed
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to do that,” suggesting that such a basis was lacking.
Id. This does not account, of course, for the trackers employed by the myriad other federal
investigative agencies, such as ATF, DEA, and ICE, or state and local agencies.
25 See infra Part V.
26 Compare, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, Davis v. United States: The Exclusion Revolution
Continues, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 381, 395–96 (2011) (arguing that Davis really set up a
stealth “officer culpability” standard that is equivalent to the traditional qualified immunity
standard), and Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing
and Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 727 (2011) (arguing that Herring implicitly
adopts the qualified immunity standard as the suppression test), with, e.g., John M. Greabe,
Objecting at the Altar: Why the Herring Good Faith Principle and the Harlow Qualified
Immunity Doctrine Should Not Be Married, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 1 (2012) (just
like it says), Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99
GEO. L.J. 1077, 1079 (2011) (arguing that the good-faith exception should not be extended
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cle, I defend what I see as the clearest interpretation of Davis, and set out a
general framework for applying the Davis rule to the array of possible interac-
tions between state and federal precedent that will confront trial courts in the
myriad Davis scenarios that will arise as technology outpaces caselaw.
The practical question animating this Article is simple: What should hap-
pen to all these tracker investigations?27 To develop that answer, I must also
answer a theoretical question that has vexed commentators in the wake of
Davis: How broad is the Davis rule? Did Davis really push Leon all the way to
Harlow?28 That is, did Davis really hold that the suppression test is identical to
the qualified immunity test—which turns on whether the officer violated
clearly established law?
I argue that the answer is an emphatic “no.” Despite the fears of some
commentators,29 that is simply not what Davis held. I think courts will read
Davis as a straightforward adoption of the “settled-law” standard: in order to
shelter under the good-faith exception, the officer’s conduct must have been
expressly authorized by clearly established law.30 Davis does not import
Harlow into Leon: in cases of ambiguity or uncertainty, the evidence should be
suppressed under Davis (because the officer was not expressly authorized by
precedent), but the officer will also have qualified immunity (because he did
not violate clearly established law).
Several prominent scholars, including Professors Tomkovicz, Greabe, and
Laurin, fear that Davis has collapsed the suppression test into the qualified
immunity test.31 I think they are wrong. But, as this Article explains, we don’t
have to take my word for it: let’s just follow the GPS tracker cases that are
about to explode in the wake of Jones. Jones provides a perfect test of the
application of Davis to contexts of legal certainty and uncertainty. The pre-
Jones appellate caselaw on GPS tracking varied widely, at the state and circuit
level, ranging from silence to express disapproval to express approval. If I am
right about Davis, then we should see different suppression results from juris-
diction to jurisdiction depending on the state of the pre-Jones tracker caselaw.
In this Article, I make a state-by-state prediction about tracker evidence admis-
sibility post-Jones, and set out a general framework for applying Davis in the
to changes in the law) [hereinafter Kerr, Good Faith], and Ross M. Oklewicz, Comment,
Expanding the Scope of the Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 59 AM. U. L.
REV. 1715, 1755 (discussing the circuit precedents at issue in Davis, and characterizing the
contested rule as involving “objectively reasonable reliance on a well-settled and unambigu-
ous decision of an appellate court.”).
27 The day after Jones was decided, a former student of mine contacted me. He was work-
ing in a DA’s office and had a tracker investigation case that was heading for trial. “What’s
going to happen?” he asked. The answer was easy for California, but thinking through the
application of Davis to the various jurisdictional permutations—and the scholarly disagree-
ment about the reach of Davis—persuaded me that someone needed to write this article. I
hope I am the first!
28 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982), sets out the test for qualified immunity,
which provides that government actors have qualified immunity from suit so long as their
actions did not violate clearly established law.
29 See supra note 26.
30 See Kerr, Good Faith, supra note 26, at 1112–15.
31 See, e.g., Laurin, supra note 26, at 744; Greabe, supra note 26, at 1; Tomkovicz, supra
note 26, at 396–97.
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various combinations of state/circuit precedent that can apply. If the lower
courts adopt my preferred reading of Davis—as some already have—then the
framework sketched here should apply to all novel surveillance technologies.
III. UNITED STATES V. JONES
In Jones, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the installation and
monitoring of a GPS tracker on a suspect’s car was a “search” within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment. The use of trackers had not been thought by law
enforcement to be a Fourth Amendment search. Prior to Jones, virtually every
court to consider the question had held that attaching tracking devices and mon-
itoring cars’ movements was not a search.32 The courts relied on two Supreme
Court cases from the 1960s, Knotts33 and Karo,34 which involved monitoring
of “beepers” (pre-GPS tracking devices). The key fact in those cases (at least
everyone thought so until Jones) was that the cars were being monitored while
they were on public roads, where anyone could see them, and thus there was no
invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy.35
Then, in 2010, the D.C. Circuit held, in a surprising decision, that long-
term GPS monitoring is a search because the accumulation of many individual
pieces of information about location creates a “mosaic” that reveals so much
about a person that it violates his reasonable expectation of privacy.36 The
Supreme Court took the case and many observers (including me, I must admit)
predicted that the Court would summarily reject the “mosaic theory” and
explicitly affirm what the other circuits had held: that GPS tracking is not a
search.
Instead, the Court agreed 9-0 that the GPS tracking at issue in the case was
a search. But the Court fragmented badly on why. Four justices (Alito, Gins-
burg, Breyer, and Kagan) endorsed the mosaic theory, and would hold that
long-term monitoring invades a reasonable expectation of privacy.37 And the
majority (Scalia, Thomas, Roberts, Kennedy, and Sotomayor) poured out a
sparkling new wine from a very old bottle, announcing a common-law trespass
test that is now a new rule, complementing Katz: whenever the police engage in
conduct that would have been a common-law trespass in 1791, and do so for
the purpose of gaining information, they have engaged in a “search.”38 Justice
Sotomayor, in what will likely be remembered as a bold strategic stroke of
doctrine shaping, endorsed both the “trespass-rule” theory (with her vote), and
the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy theory (with her written opinion, which
32 See infra Part V.
33 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
34 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708 (1984).
35 Jones tells us that the key fact of these cases was actually that the physical installation of
the device in each case did not constitute a trespass on a 1791 common law analysis. United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951–52 (2012); see also id. at 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring).
36 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
37 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957.
38 Id. at 949 (“The Government physically occupied private property for the purpose of
obtaining information. We have no doubt that such a physical intrusion would have been
considered a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”).
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concurred with the Alito opinion and announced a readiness to dramatically
expand the Katz analysis for the social media age).39
There are myriad fascinating potential consequences of Jones that will be
written about at length this season;40 but here I am interested in only one point:
before January 23, 2012, GPS tracking was not a search,41 and after January
23, 2012, it was a search. This Article is about how the suppression rules treat
such changes in the law—how courts should deal with cases adjudicated after
Jones with evidence obtained before Jones.
IV. THE “GOOD-FAITH RELIANCE ON PRECEDENT” RULE:
EXPRESS AUTHORIZATION?
A. United States v. Davis
In June 2011, in United States v. Davis, the Supreme Court announced
what I will call the “faith-in-caselaw” exception to the exclusionary rule. In
Davis, the prior legal rule at issue was the “vehicle-search-incident-to-arrest”
rule from New York v. Belton.42 The Belton rule, as adumbrated by the circuits,
was about as clear and unambiguous as one could want: lower courts, including
the Eleventh Circuit, had uniformly interpreted it as a bright-line rule that
searches of the interior of the car were per se permissible incident to the arrest
of an occupant.43 That is what the police did in Davis, in reliance on Belton and
the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Gonzalez, which “read Belton to establish a
bright-line rule.”44
But then, in between the arrest and the appeal, Gant45 came along, limited
Belton,46 overruled the bright-line circuit interpretations, and held such car
searches violated the Fourth Amendment.47 So the Davis question was whether
39 Id. at 954–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
40 Here are a few: Is common-law trespass now a viable basis for Fourth Amendment chal-
lenges once again, now that the Court has stated that Katz did not narrow the scope of the
Fourth Amendment from its original trespass-based scope? How about the curtilage cases,
then? How about Place (seizing luggage under Terry)? What about Justice Sotomayor’s
suggestion that the Court re-think the whole Katz framework for the social media age? Or is
Scalia trying to introduce a stalking horse for throwing out Katz altogether? How about
standing in tracker cases? Will passengers in cars be covered, or just drivers—or even just
owners? How about the practical effect on criminal investigation? See, e.g., de Vogue, supra
note 24 (discussing the FBI’s decision to turn off more than 3,000 trackers currently being
used in investigations).
41 Except in D.C., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954, aff’g 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010), and for
state-law purposes in Delaware, Massachusetts, New York, and Oregon. See infra Part V.
42 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981).
43 See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (2011) (quoting Belton’s self-descrip-
tion as announcing a “straightforward” and “workable rule,” and explaining that “[f]or years,
Belton was widely understood to have set down a simple, bright-line rule.”).
44 Id. at 2426.
45 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
46 Or, as the dissenters argued, overruled it. Id. at 356 (Alito, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 351.
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evidence found in Belton-rule vehicle searches needed to be suppressed in
cases still pending at the time Gant was decided.48
The question in this case is whether to apply the exclusionary rule when the
police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding judicial prece-
dent. At the time of the search at issue here, we had not yet decided Arizona v. Gant,
and the Eleventh Circuit had interpreted our decision in New York v. Belton, to estab-
lish a bright-line rule authorizing the search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment
incident to a recent occupant’s arrest.  The search incident to Davis’s arrest in this
case followed the Eleventh Circuit’s Gonzalez precedent to the letter. Although the
search turned out to be unconstitutional under Gant, all agree that the officers’ con-
duct was in strict compliance with then-binding Circuit law and was not culpable in
any way.49
The Court held that the evidence from such searches should not be sup-
pressed because the exclusionary rule could not “pay its way” in cases where
the police conduct was expressly authorized by governing caselaw.50 “The
rule’s sole purpose,” explained the Court, “is to deter future Fourth Amend-
ment violations.”51 In Davis, the police had “followed the Eleventh Circuit’s
Gonzalez precedent to the letter.”52 It was undisputed that the prior caselaw
clearly and affirmatively authorized the action. This “acknowledged absence of
police culpability dooms Davis’s claim.”53
About all that exclusion would deter in this case is conscientious police work.
Responsible law-enforcement officers will take care to learn “what is required of
them” under Fourth Amendment precedent and will conform their conduct to these
rules. But by the same token, when binding appellate precedent specifically autho-
rizes a particular police practice, well-trained officers will and should use that tool to
fulfill their crime-detection and public-safety responsibilities. An officer who con-
ducts a search in reliance on binding appellate precedent does no more than “ ‘ac[t]
as a reasonable officer would and should act’ ” under the circumstances. The deter-
rent effect of exclusion in such a case can only be to discourage the officer from
“ ‘do[ing] his duty.’ ”54
B. Two Possible Good-Faith Rules
The scope of Davis’s “faith-in-caselaw” rule is a question of enormous
importance for the practice and theory of criminal investigation. There are two
possible rules one could extract from Davis.55 One possibility is a “permitted-
unless-prohibited” rule—that is, evidence will not be suppressed unless the
police conduct violated a clearly established holding. The other possibility is a
48 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423–24. This was an important question, because there were many
such cases. The vehicle search incident to arrest was a particular rich vein of “get-lucky”
contraband busts.
49 Id. at 2428 (citations omitted).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 2426.
52 Id. at 2428.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 2429 (internal citations omitted).
55 They are familiar to fans of the old “prohibited-unless-permitted” jokes, e.g., “In the
U.S., everything not prohibited is permitted. In Russia, everything not permitted is prohib-
ited.” Then comes the punch line, naming a country where everything permitted is
prohibited.
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“prohibited-unless-permitted” rule—that is, evidence will be suppressed unless
the police conduct was expressly authorized by a clearly established holding.
The two rules give the same suppression result whenever the governing
appellate court has squarely decided a question. If the caselaw says, “Cops get
to search the vehicle just because they arrested someone who was in it,” then
evidence found during any such search conducted while that case is good law
will not be suppressed. And if the caselaw says, “Cops do not get to search the
vehicle just because they arrested someone who was in it,” then evidence found
during any such search conducted while that case is good law, will be
suppressed.
The difference between the two rules is in the vast gray area between
express prohibition and express authorization. Fourth Amendment law will
always be painted in shades of gray across much of its scope because of the
Darwinian struggle between cops and robbers.56 Each side is continually pursu-
ing new strategies and technologies to gain an advantage. It takes time for
caselaw to catch up.57 So where a court has not yet expressly ruled on the
legitimacy of a particular tactic—say, whether planting a GPS tracker on a car
and monitoring its movements on public streets is a “search”—the police con-
duct will be neither expressly prohibited nor expressly permitted. And then the
legal question that arises when a court finally does decide that some tactic is a
search is: Should evidence obtained then with that tactic, at a time when there
was no express rule either way, be admitted now, when there is a clear prohibi-
tion? That’s where the two possible constructions of the “faith-in-caselaw” rule
give different answers.
The question, in short, is whether Davis provides for good-faith shelter in
contexts of legal ambiguity. And Davis itself did not involve such a context—
Davis is about a search that had been expressly authorized by the governing
appellate court, interpreting a Supreme Court case that for thirty years had been
thought by every criminal lawyer in the country to stand for a bright-line rule
authorizing that search.58 And the holding tracks that posture. The Court is
concerned with situations in which governing precedent expressly authorizes
the police conduct. Davis has nothing to say—to my ears, at least—about
ambiguity or silence in the caselaw. The penultimate sentence of the decision is
the most explicit statement of the holding: “We therefore hold that when the
police conduct a search in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate
precedent, the exclusionary rule does not apply.”59 What’s the referent of that
“therefore”? It is this (a sentence up): “It is one thing for the criminal to go free
because the constable has blundered. It is quite another to set the criminal free
because the constable has scrupulously adhered to governing law.”60
So is Davis announcing a “prohibited-unless-permitted” rule? I certainly
think so. Here are the three most obvious reasons:
56 See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 486 (2011).
57 Id.
58 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2424.
59 Id. at 2434.
60 Id.
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(a) The Court says “expressly authorized.” If the majority were trying to
parallel the qualified immunity caselaw, it would have used language that par-
alleled the qualified immunity caselaw. But the Court didn’t. It explicitly used a
formula that was well understood to state a different test.61 And there’s not a
word in Davis about police reliance on ambiguity or uncertainty in the law.
(b) The facts in Davis did not involve a gray area where caselaw was
silent or ambiguous. They involved express authorization.
(c) Perhaps most importantly, the Eleventh Circuit case that the Court
affirmed not only announced an explicit express-authorization holding, but also
repeatedly and explicitly rejected a “permitted-unless-prohibited” rule, empha-
sizing that the good-faith exception did not extend to ambiguous or unsettled
caselaw.62 The Eleventh Circuit said exclusion is still the remedy unless the
law is clearly settled; because officers are not expected to engage in nuanced
legal analysis, the courts should not incentivize officers to push doctrinal
boundaries. “[O]ur precedent . . . must be unequivocal before we will suspend
the exclusionary rule’s operation,” the court explained.63
If the Supreme Court was announcing a different, broader test in Davis—
one implicated neither by the facts of the case nor by the Eleventh Circuit
opinion—it surely would have said so.
Here’s what Davis involves, in the Court’s own words: a “bright-line rule”
that expressly authorizes a search, where the police “followed the . . . precedent
to the letter” and “scrupulously adhered to governing law.”64 Nothing in Davis
suggests that the “faith-in-caselaw” rule should extend to ambiguity or silence.
Nothing in Davis suggests that police conduct should be sheltered from trigger-
ing suppression simply on the ground that the police conduct had not yet been
explicitly prohibited.
Professor Tomkovicz thinks otherwise. He claims that the rhetoric of the
Davis opinion, referring to “officer culpability,” and following on Hudson v.
Michigan65 and Herring,66 suggests a new test for suppression that will be
identical to the test for qualified immunity and will require violation of an
express prohibition.67 With all due respect to Professor Tomkovicz, I think he
drastically overreads Davis. I yield to no one in my disapproval of the putative
nuptials of Leon and Harlow, but I just can’t agree that the Davis Court is
popping the question.
Professor Tomkovicz is, of course, correct that Davis refers to “police
culpability” as a sine qua non of suppression.68 The Court says that the cost-
benefit inquiry must focus on the “flagrancy of the police misconduct,” that the
“deterrence benefits of exclusion ‘vary with the culpability of the law enforce-
61 See, e.g., United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1044 (10th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Debruhl, 993 A.2d 571, 578 (D.C. 2010). Indeed, Professor Kerr—who argued Davis in
the Supreme Court—had proposed an “express authorization” test as a soft landing, in an
article published before the argument. Kerr, Good Faith, supra note 26, at 1114–15.
62 See United States v. Davis, 598 F.3d 1259, 1266–68 (11th Cir. 2010).
63 Id. at 1266.
64 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428, 2434.
65 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
66 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
67 Tomkovicz, supra note 26, at 392–94.
68 Id. at 393.
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ment conduct’ at issue,” and that “in 27 years [since Leon] we have ‘never
applied’ the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence obtained as a result of
nonculpable, innocent police conduct.”69
But the question is not whether culpability is part of the inquiry; the ques-
tion is what constitutes culpability? Will an officer be deemed culpable for
good-faith purposes if he engages in conduct that the courts have never ruled
on?
Take a simple hypothetical. Say you are a police officer. You make a
traffic stop. You run the driver’s license, and you see a “failure-to-appear” war-
rant from a previous traffic ticket. So you arrest him. You do a full-person
search incident to the arrest. You turn up nothing incriminating, just a little
cash, some keys, and a smart-phone. Can you search the phone? Well, you start
with a physical search. You pop open the case to see if there are drugs con-
cealed inside. Nothing. So you turn it on and start clicking through it. This is a
pure “get-lucky” search: you have no basis to suspect that you’ll find anything
in particular; you’re just searching because you can. You read the guy’s address
book, you look at all his pictures, you read his e-mails and texts. You open a
web browser and his Facebook page comes up, logged in and ready to go. You
start clicking around, looking at the guy’s whole life history. Completely by
chance, you stumble across some evidence. You follow the evidence, the guy
gets charged.
Now, a week before trial (and a year after your search) the governing
appellate court finally issues a decision on cell phone searches incident to
arrest. And it says: Stop it! It announces, say, a Gant-type rule, to wit,
“Searches of cell phone contents are not permitted incident to arrest unless
there is reason to believe that the phone contains evidence of the crime of
arrest.”
Well, your search was certainly not that. But at the time you carried out
the search there was no case on point. The best you had was United States v.
Robinson, which was about searching a coat pocket.70 So should the Facebook
evidence and its fruits be suppressed?71
Do I have to say again how important the Davis question is? The current
law on searches of smartphones incident to arrest is anything but clear.72 Some
jurisdictions have nothing; some have pragmatic container analogies; some
have “go-for-it!” rules. So the big question forced on us by Davis is: What do
we want police doing in situations of legal uncertainty? If Davis actually
announced a “permitted-unless-prohibited” rule, as the scholars noted above
think it did, then all of your get-lucky evidence comes in, because the courts
didn’t yet have any clear caselaw on searching smartphones.73 If Davis actually
announced a “prohibited-unless-permitted” rule, as I think it did, then all of that
69 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427, 2429.
70 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 218 (1973).
71 See, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 704 S.E.2d 886, 892 (Ga. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d, 723 S.E.2d
924 (Ga. 2012) (analyzing scope of permissible cell phone search incident to arrest).
72 E.g., United States v. Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2012).
73 And as I explain below, if that becomes the rule, then that hypothetical appellate case
ruling your search illegal could never even arise.
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evidence will be suppressed, because there was no case expressly authorizing
it.
In terms of incentives, then, the “permitted-unless-prohibited” rule would
create an enormous incentive for the police to push boundaries wherever the
caselaw left exploitable gaps. “Hey, you never said I couldn’t do that” would
become an absolute inoculation against suppression, in cases where a court
ultimately ruled the search illegal. The message to police would be, “Keep
pushing until they tell you to stop, and then push somewhere else.” And noth-
ing in Davis suggests that is the message the Court wants to send. Indeed,
Davis suggests quite the opposite.74
I think the Court’s reliance on the traditional concept of the “good cop” is
highly significant. Professor Tomkovicz sees the “good cop” rhetoric as trans-
forming the test into one of individual police culpability, where suppression is a
“punishment” for the bad cop.75 But the “good cop” approach is more informa-
tive, I think, on the question of whether the “express authorization” test means
what it says. The deterrence rationale for suppression supposes that we want
cops to behave in certain ways, and when they do what we want there is no
point in suppressing the evidence they obtain. Within the Leon context of
facially valid warrants, it is easy: we want cops going to magistrates and using
a minimal level of interpretive skills in reading the warrant.
But Davis forces us to think about what we want cops to be doing with
respect to appellate caselaw. It’s a question I think a lot about—I used to talk
with agents about caselaw all the time. Nowadays, I regularly bring cops to my
criminal procedure classes, and I always ask them to talk about their relation-
ship to caselaw. And I think the “good cop” analysis here is easy: we want cops
relying on caselaw when caselaw expressly authorizes a search, but we do not
want them relying on gaps and ambiguities in caselaw to push the Fourth
Amendment envelope.76
No one claims that part of being a good cop is generating creative applica-
tions of ambiguous law that might justify warrantless searches.77 That is not
74 See Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2428–29.
75 See Tomkovicz, supra note 26 at 393–94.
76 There’s no better illustration of what happens when law enforcement pushes the limits of
ambiguous judicial endorsements of tactics than what school administrators did with New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 346–47 (1985) (search of purse permissible with articulable
individual suspicion that student was hiding drugs therein); Administrators kept pushing on
the boundaries of their searching authority, and the doctrine has morphed into Vernonia Sch.
Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661–65 (1995) (drug testing requirement for high school
athletes permissible on showing of actual drug problem at school centering on athletes), and
then into Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002) (drug testing requirement for all
extracurricular activities permissible absent any school-specific concerns whatsoever,
because a “nationwide drug epidemic” was a “pressing concern in every school”), and then
into such farcical but all too real episodes as the Rancho Bernardo assistant principal who
lined up girls for thong inspections at a school dance. (Seriously: see Eleanor Yang, Rancho
Bernardo High Official Suspended Over Underwear Inspection, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.
(May 1, 2002), http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/northcounty/20020501—n75890.html.
77 The best recent survey of this problem and potential solutions is Mary D. Fan, The Police
Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1407, 1408 (2011).
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how cops think of their relationship to caselaw,78 it is not how prosecutors
think of cops’ relationship to caselaw,79 and it is not how judges think of cops’
relationship to caselaw.80
Davis makes sense as progeny of Leon and Herring only on the “express
authorization” reading. It makes little sense on any terms if its holding is taken
to mean that where caselaw is ambiguous, there will never be suppression.
So, I think Davis provides a good-faith shelter for evidence obtained in
searches in which the police relied on caselaw that, at the time of the search,
expressly authorized a particular practice. I think it does not provide a shelter
where caselaw at the time of the search was ambiguous.
This question is extraordinarily important for everyone in the cops-and-
robbers business. In a case in which the police find evidence by engaging in
conduct that has been held, by the time of trial, to violate the Fourth Amend-
ment (and no other exceptions apply), the evidence will be suppressed, or not,
based on what the binding appellate precedent in the jurisdiction had to say
about that sort of conduct at the time of the search. On my reading of Davis, the
evidence will be suppressed unless the caselaw expressly authorized the search.
Under the Tomkovicz et al. reading that Davis has collapsed the suppression
test into the qualified immunity test, the evidence will be suppressed only when
the caselaw expressly prohibited the search.
The distinction between the two readings will make a huge difference in
practice because criminal investigation, by its nature, pushes into gray areas in
the law: police conduct that was neither expressly authorized nor expressly pro-
hibited. And this will be an ongoing dynamic, as every year’s law-enforcement
procurement convention introduces new investigative technologies that present
courts with new analytical challenges.
V. APPLYING THE FAITH-IN-CASELAW TEST: A GENERAL FRAMEWORK
In a Davis scenario, the Supreme Court will change a rule, declaring con-
duct previously deemed lawful to be unlawful. In Gant, it was car searches
incident to arrest;81 in Jones, it was GPS trackers.82 The question is whether
78 See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL HAND-
BOOK FOR SPECIAL AGENTS, 7-4 Waiver of Rights, 5–7 (1993) (providing for consultation
with AUSA in situations of legal ambiguity).
79 See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 755–56 (2003).
80 See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (“[A] police officer is not charged
with predicting the future course of constitutional law.”). Of course, that’s a qualified immu-
nity case, but the underlying point is exactly the same: the reason we give cops immunity
when the law is unsettled is that we don’t expect that their job duties include close parsing of
ambiguous caselaw. When the law is uncertain, they’re supposed to get guidance. See also
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982) (“If, as the Government argues, all
rulings resolving unsettled Fourth Amendment questions should be nonretroactive, then, in
close cases, law enforcement officials would have little incentive to err on the side of consti-
tutional behavior.”). And it’s important to emphasize that we’re not talking about second-
guessing cops in emergencies. There’s already an exigent circumstances exception. Davis
claims will never involve emergencies; rather, they involve the explicit justification of par-
ticular search conduct by pointing to caselaw.
81 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 335 (2009).
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evidence obtained by that conduct prior to the new decision should be admissi-
ble after the new decision. I have set out all the possibilities for prior caselaw in
a Davis scenario in the following chart. The relevant courts are the state courts
or the governing circuit, and the relevant positions are: approve (it is not a
search); disapprove (it is a search); silence83 (no caselaw). So with three values
and two variables, there are nine (32) possible combinations, as illustrated
below:
1 2 3
State Circuit State Circuit State Circuit
Approve X X Approve X Approve X
Disapprove Disapprove X Disapprove
Silent Silent Silent X
4 5 6
State Circuit State Circuit State Circuit
Approve X Approve Approve
Disapprove X Disapprove X X Disapprove X
Silent Silent Silent X
7 8 9
State Circuit State Circuit State Circuit
Approve X Approve Approve
Disapprove Disapprove X Disapprove
Silent X Silent X Silent X X
My analytic framework will apply to all future Davis issues—of which
there will be many because Davis issues will arise now every time the Supreme
Court announces or alters a Fourth Amendment rule, and that happens once a
term at least. For a given investigative technique in a given jurisdiction, one of
these boxes will apply.84 What follows are my predictions about how the courts
will treat Davis claims for each combination of state and federal caselaw. Obvi-
ously, we all have Jones on our minds right now, but I have written the expla-
nations below in general terms—so you can pull out the chart next time the
Supreme Court changes another rule.85
BOX 1—State Approval/Federal Approval:
These cases are the easiest: prior to the new Supreme Court case, there
was controlling authority from both the state and federal courts expressly
authorizing the conduct. Davis will shelter evidence gained from that conduct
in those states.
82 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
83 You could have more combinations—such as “approved but distinguished.” I would treat
such precedent as “silent.”
84 For example, as to Jones, California is in Box 1: pre-Jones, both state caselaw and Ninth
Circuit caselaw held that tracker installation and use was not a search. See, e.g., United
States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999); People v. Zichwic, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d
733, 742 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). Evidence obtained in pre-Jones tracker investigations in
California thus would shelter under Davis, so there would be no suppression.
85 For example, when the Court decides whether bringing a drug dog to the front door of a
house to sniff the air is a “search.” See Florida v. Jardines, 132 S. Ct. 995 (2012).
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BOX 2—State Approval/Federal Disapproval:
Here the state courts have authorized the conduct, but the circuit court
held it to violate the Fourth Amendment.86 Clearly, there will be no Davis
claim available in federal investigations. But will there be one for state
officers? The answer is likely yes because state courts need not follow circuit
courts, even on questions of federal constitutional interpretation. As it happens,
we had no such scenario in Jones, but it will surely happen in future cases.
BOX 3—State Approval/Federal Silence:
Here the state courts have approved the conduct, and the circuit court has
not spoken. So a state officer would, I think, have a strong Davis claim. But
what about a federal agent who engaged in the conduct—for example, warrant-
less GPS tracking—while investigating a federal crime for prosecution in fed-
eral court? Would there be Davis shelter in federal court for this federal
investigation on the basis of the state court decision? The best answer is no.
There should not be a good-faith shelter claim for several obvious reasons:
federal agents do not base their conduct on state law; state laws generally do
not constrain federal agents in their investigations;87 state interpretations of the
Fourth Amendment do not govern federal trials; and the Supreme Court has
expressly held that adherence to or violation of state law is irrelevant to a fed-
eral Fourth Amendment analysis.88 Accordingly, a federal district judge hear-
ing a federal Fourth Amendment claim would not defer to what the state courts
in the district had to say about the matter. So any concept of “good-faith reli-
ance” here would be misplaced.
BOX 4—State Disapproval/Federal Approval:
Here the two authorities disagree, so the suppression decision should turn
on whether the investigation and prosecution was federal or state. Federal
investigations should shelter; state investigations should not. Oregon, for exam-
ple, was in Box 4 on GPS tracking: the state courts held tracking to be a
search,89 but the Ninth Circuit held it not to be a search.90 Davis shelter in such
scenarios should turn on whether the investigation was state or federal because
86 We had such a scenario here in California for about a year, under Brendlin. Brendlin v.
California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007). The state supreme court held that passengers in vehicles
were not actually “seized” in traffic stops, so they had no standing to raise suppression
claims if the stop was illegal. Id. at 253.
87 See, e.g., Caleb E. Mason, The Police-Prosecutor Relationship and the No-Contact Rule:
Conflicting Incentives After Montejo v. Louisiana and Maryland v. Shatzer, 58 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 747, 755 (2010).
88 Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171 (2008).
89 Oregon is not unique here, even in the tracking context. Colorado, for example, rejected
even the Karo “beeper” rule. See People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815–16 (Colo. 1985) (“[I]n
interpreting article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution, we are not bound by the deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court construing the federal constitution. . . . We con-
clude that the broader definition of what constitutes a legitimate expectation of privacy under
the Colorado Constitution encompasses the expectation that purchased commercial goods
will be free of government surveillance devices such as beepers. We therefore depart from
the reasoning in Karo and hold that the installation and continued presence of the beeper in
this case infringed upon the legitimate expectations of privacy of at least one defendant, and
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federal agents, as noted above, are not constrained by state-court Fourth
Amendment interpretations or state constitutional protections. A federal agent
in Oregon would properly ignore Oregon law and rely on the Ninth Circuit.91
So federal-investigation tracker evidence will be admitted, under Davis, in fed-
eral trials. But it’s hard to see how state investigations could possibly shelter
under Davis. A state officer, investigating a state crime for prosecution in state
court, is bound by the state court’s interpretation of the law.92 (And the Oregon
case was decided under the state constitution, anyway.) So Davis could not
protect tracker evidence in state cases.93
therefore constituted a search requiring a warrant under article II, section 7 of the Colorado
Constitution.”).
90 United States v. Pineda-Morena, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216 (9th Cir. 2010).
91 This does not apply to federal prosecutors, who, while not bound by state evidence rules,
are bound by state ethics rules. See Mason, supra note 87, at 755.
92 I will note, but leave aside here, the fascinating and unresolved question about how,
absent a Supreme Court decision, conflicts between a state’s highest court and the governing
federal circuit are to be resolved. See, e.g., Donald H. Ziegler, Gazing into the Crystal Ball:
Reflections on the Standards State Judges Should Use to Ascertain Federal Law, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1143, 1151–68 (1999) (noting the variety of approaches state courts adopt
toward lower federal courts on questions of federal law, and collecting cases). These con-
flicts could be about the meaning of either state or federal law, and the Supreme Court has
never announced a rule for deciding who takes precedence. For example, the Sixth Circuit
and the Ohio Supreme Court are currently engaged in a running conflict over the application
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Bush v. Gore to state voting-booth allocation decisions.
See Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 239–40 (6th Cir. 2011). Or, to
give another recent example, the Ninth Circuit held California’s Proposition 8 unconstitu-
tional, see Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012); the California Supreme
Court had previously upheld it, see Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 122 (Cal. 2009). Now as
it happens, the state-court challenge had not raised any federal constitutional issues, see id.
at 78 n.11 (“In these cases, [the] petitioners have not raised any federal constitutional chal-
lenge to Proposition 8.”). But suppose it had: the state supreme court could and would have
decided them. And suppose it had upheld the statute on federal constitutional grounds too—
as it very well might have, see id. at 130 (Moreno, J., dissenting) (explaining that per Cali-
fornia precedent, the equal protection provisions of the state constitution have always been
interpreted to be at least as protective as those of the federal constitution). So in such a
scenario, what happens? Both sides rush to their respective trial courts to get injunctions.
The federal injunction says do x, e.g., issue the marriage license; the state injunction says do
not do x. What advice would you give the county official? Would we really be in a no-man’s
land of dueling orders? The naı¨ve citizen, after having learned in school or heard on TV that
our Constitution creates the perfect federal-state balance, might be surprised to learn that
there is actually no agreed-upon procedure for settling this question. As Ziegler, supra, doc-
uments, most of the time such questions never get settled at all. Ziegler, supra, at 1152–53.
93 Other states make it easier. In California, for example, a constitutional amendment, Pro-
position 8 (not that one—an earlier one) provides that California’s state-constitution Fourth
Amendment language is “pegged” to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal
Fourth Amendment. Proposition 8 (1982) (codified as CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28); see also
Steven D. Blades, Comment, Proposition 8: It May Go Beyond the Fourth Amendment, 19
SW. U. L. REV. 57, 57, 65 (1990). Other states do the same thing through caselaw. See, e.g.,
North Carolina v. Hendricks, 258 S.E.2d 872, 877 (“[T]here is no variance between the
search and seizure law of North Carolina and the requirements of the Fourth Amendment as
interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States.”).
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BOX 5—State and Federal Disapproval:
This one is easy—no shelter.
BOX 6—State Disapproval/Federal Silence:
Here the federal circuit court has not spoken, but the state court has disap-
proved the conduct. Delaware, Massachusetts, and New York are in Box 6: the
pre-Jones caselaw consisted of disapproval (“it is a search”) from the state
court, and silence from the First, Second, and Third Circuits. Pre-Jones tracker
investigations in these states are highly unlikely to get Davis shelter.
BOX 7—State Silence/Federal Approval:
How about investigations in states with no state caselaw, and approval
from the circuit? For GPS tracking, twenty-one states in the Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had no prior state caselaw.94 In those
states, pre-Jones, the governing federal circuit had held that tracker use is not a
search, and the state courts had not said anything. Federal agents in those states
therefore have a straightforward Davis claim.
As for state police in those states, prosecutors would certainly make a
shelter claim under Davis, arguing that state officers reasonably relied on the
governing appellate caselaw. But this argument is vulnerable on two fronts.
First, as a practical matter, the federal Fourth Amendment analysis might not be
dispositive if the state’s Fourth Amendment is interpreted more strictly by state
courts than the federal Fourth Amendment is by federal courts. State investiga-
tions must comply with the state constitution as well as the federal constitution.
So as to state constitutional violations, the police were acting under pure uncer-
tainty. The Colorado Supreme Court’s rejection of Karo should make this per-
fectly clear.95
Second, while state courts are bound by Supreme Court decisions as to the
meaning of the federal Fourth Amendment, they need not, as outlined above,96
follow the regional federal circuit courts, even in interpreting the federal Con-
stitution. Thus (as in the pre-Jones tracker cases at issue here), when there is no
Supreme Court decision on point with respect to a particular type of investiga-
tive conduct, there is always the possibility that a state court could issue a
ruling interpreting not just the state but also the federal Fourth Amendment as
prohibiting the conduct, despite the existence of a federal circuit precedent
approving it. In a posture of state-court silence on tracking, therefore, it does
not make sense to say that state police were “expressly authorized” to engage
in the conduct. For those reasons, Davis should be inapplicable to states with
no clear state-court decisions on tracking.
Of course, state prosecutors will undoubtedly argue otherwise, and it is
certainly possible that some state courts will agree with them. Much may
94 In order by circuit: Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Arkansas,
Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, North Dakota, Nebraska, South Dakota, Alaska, Arizona,
Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Alabama, Florida, Georgia. (California, Oregon, and Nevada had
prior state caselaw).
95 People v. Oates, 698 P.2d 811, 815–16 (Colo. 1985).
96 See supra text accompanying notes 86–95.
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depend on the particular relationship between the state and federal Fourth
Amendment language for a particular state. For example, in California, the state
constitution “pegs” the state’s constitutional amendment language to the federal
Fourth Amendment.97 (The state courts might still disagree with the Ninth Cir-
cuit about the meaning of the federal Fourth Amendment, to be sure.)
This is an important question because most law enforcement is done at the
state level, and most cases are state cases. For example, Davis itself started as a
state investigation; the evidence found in the state search led to a federal prose-
cution. In a posture in which the search in question was expressly disapproved
by the state court, but approved by the relevant federal circuit court, how
should state police make investigatory decisions? If you are the duty DA and
you get the call, what do you say? “Well, Detective, the evidence will be sup-
pressed in state court, but if you find anything the feds might want, it will be
admitted in federal court?”98 What then? Did the state officers have any reason
to think that their search was going to turn up evidence for a federal
prosecution?
And state investigations that lead to federal prosecutions are very com-
mon.99 Davis itself, for example, was just a run-of-the-mill arrest. Because the
search turned up a gun and Davis had a rap sheet, the case was referred to the
feds for felon-in-possession-of-firearm prosecution. The Department of Justice
has a program called Project Safe Neighborhoods that encourages such refer-
rals.100 In a case like Davis, the police officers have no idea, at the time they do
the search, that the evidence may ultimately be destined for admission in fed-
eral court. So, for a good-faith analysis, we should at least be curious about the
governing state law, in addition to wanting to know the status of governing
federal circuit law. Yet the Court in Davis never even mentions Alabama’s
then-governing caselaw on Belton searches.101
97 That’s the other Prop 8, from back in 1982. See supra note 93.
98 This scenario is not at all implausible: it is what happened, for example, in Arizona v.
Gant, where the Ninth Circuit had approved the per se Belton rule for vehicle searches
incident to arrest, but the Arizona state courts had rejected it. 556 U.S. 332, 356 (2009). So
prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Gant, evidence found in an incident-to-arrest vehi-
cle search would have been inadmissible in state court but admissible in federal court.
99 See e.g., Prosecutorial Discretion, 40 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 227, 228–29
n.678 (2011). As a federal prosecutor, I prosecuted many cases involving state investigations
that were adopted by federal agencies for prosecution in federal court, often under initiatives
such as Project Safe Neighborhoods or Secure Communities. See generally Edmund F.
McGarrell et al., Project Safe Neighborhoods—A National Program to Reduce Gun Crime,
FINAL PROJECT REP. (Nat’l Inst. of Just./Mich. St. U. Sch. of Crim. Just., East Lansing, MI),
Feb. 2009 available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/226686.pdf; SECURE COM-
MUNITIES, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
100 I had a number of these cases. State police or DAs would refer cases where the guy had
a gun and a rap sheet, and we would bring 922 charges. See 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006).
101 I looked it up, though. As it happens, Alabama state caselaw expressly authorized the
search too: State v. Gargus, 855 So. 2d 587, 590 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003) (quoting State v.
Otwell, 733 So. 2d 950, 954 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)) (“ ‘When officers lawfully arrest an
automobile occupant, they may search the passenger compartment of the automobile as a
contemporaneous incident of the arrest, and they also may examine the contents of contain-
ers found in the automobile.’ ”). But you read it here first; from the Supreme Court’s Davis
decision, you would never know that the state courts had even considered the issue!
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BOX 8—State Silence/Federal Disapproval:
These cases should be easy because there is no caselaw expressly approv-
ing the practice.
BOX 9—State Silence/Federal Silence:
What’s the Davis outcome in jurisdictions with no state or federal caselaw
saying anything at all about the investigatory conduct? In the case of GPS
trackers, that’s a pretty large swath of the country. Could the government per-
haps invoke Knotts and Karo and get a good-faith exception from suppression
on the grounds that a reasonable officer could have read Knotts and Karo as
holding that installing and monitoring a GPS tracker is not a search? If so, then
the impact of Jones on pending tracker investigations is literally nil. And the
Davis argument for good faith here is not crazy; after all, the majority of courts
that considered the question read Knotts and Karo that way.
That outcome is unlikely, however, given the quite emphatic holding by
the Jones Court that all those other courts were wrong and that Knotts and
Karo did not expressly authorize the non-consensual installation of a tracker.
The Court points out that neither Knotts nor Karo involved the non-consensual
installation of a tracker. Accordingly, the Davis rebuttal would go, neither
Knotts nor Karo could possibly have expressly authorized the non-consensual
installation of a tracker. And since Davis is about express authorization (rather
than the possibility of creative analogizing), its shelter should extend only to
tracker investigations undertaken in circuits which had explicitly (though, in
hindsight, erroneously) interpreted Knotts and Karo to cover tracker
installation.
The Box 9 states, with state and federal silence on trackers, will present
the ideal test of my reading of Davis. In these jurisdictions, qualified immunity
would undoubtedly apply (because there was no clearly established law). But
on my reading of Davis, so would suppression (because there was no express
authorization). Under the Tomkovicz reading of Davis, there would be no sup-
pression of evidence in this scenario because the test would be the same as
qualified immunity.
So I’m throwing down the gauntlet: let’s watch Davis tracker cases in
Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Ver-
mont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Those are the
jurisdictions that had, as of January 2012, when Jones was decided, neither
controlling state caselaw nor controlling federal circuit law authorizing war-
rantless GPS tracking.
  The picture as of January 2012 for GPS tracking appears to have looked like
this:
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Search Not a Search Silent
Fifth, Seventh, First, Second,
Circuits DC Eighth, Ninth, Third, Fourth,
Eleventh Sixth, Tenth
Delaware, California, Nevada,States Massachusetts, All the restWashingtonNew York, Oregon
VI. DAVIS APPLIED TO JONES
In the GPS tracker scenario, there was no Belton—no Supreme Court case
expressly stating that warrantless, exception-less GPS tracking was permissible
because it was not a search.102 There were five circuits with bright-line hold-
ings that installation and monitoring was not a search. There were also three
states with that express holding from their highest courts.
That leaves six circuits103 and forty-seven states with no caselaw
expressly on point. I predict this will make for different suppression outcomes
in different places and jurisdictions based on differing pre-Jones caselaw on
trackers. I also predict that we will be able to see what Davis really stands for
by tracking suppression motions in tracker cases across jurisdictions.
A. Predictions
1. State Prosecutions
Davis shelter will apply only in those states with state caselaw holding
that GPS tracking is not a search. Those states are, as noted above: California,
Nevada, and Washington. I conclude that Davis will not provide shelter for
state tracker evidence in state prosecutions in any of the other forty-seven
states.
2. Federal Prosecutions
Davis shelter will apply to evidence from investigations in the Fifth, Sev-
enth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits: in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,104
102 The Supreme Court cases most on point, Knotts and Karo, did not—as the Jones major-
ity takes pains to explain—involve nonconsensual placement of the tracking device on the
suspect’s vehicle. The Jones Court reads Knotts and Karo as authorizing only tracking
devices placed on an object with the owner’s consent. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 951–52 (2012). And no one disputes that consensual installation was unambiguously
the factual scenario presented by those cases.
103 Because the DC Circuit followed Maynard, which governed for the eighteen months
before Jones. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (The D.C. Cir.
decided Maynard on Aug. 6, 2010 and followed the decision until the Supreme Court
decided Jones on Jan. 23, 2012).
104 After this Article was written, my prediction was borne out by a ruling regarding an ATF
case in U.S. District Court in Nevada. See United States v. Fata, No. 2:11-cr-00188-RLH-
CWH, 2012 WL 1716207, at *1 (D. Nev. May 14, 2012) (order adopting Report and Recom-
mendation of United States Magistrate Judge, United States v. Fata, No. 2:11-cr-00188-
RLH, 2012 WL 1715496, at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 15, 2012)) (holding evidence obtained by the
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North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. In
the other states, it will not apply.
3. Test of the Meaning of Davis
There remain twenty-four states that had neither federal nor state tracker
caselaw: Colorado, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michi-
gan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennes-
see, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, West Virginia, Utah, and Wyoming. All
those states are in Box 9, with no binding, on-point appellate authority at the
state or federal level. So we will have plenty of opportunity to see what the
lower courts think Davis means. In my view, Davis cannot provide good-faith
shelter in those states, to either state or federal investigations, because there
was no pre-Jones caselaw expressly authorizing warrantless tracking.
B. How “Express” Does the Caselaw Have to Be?
This is a significant question, because if you read “express authorization”
broadly enough, you would find it even where the Supreme Court later stepped
in and corrected everyone’s misreading of the prior caselaw. That is what hap-
pened with Knotts and Karo. Everyone—every court to consider the ques-
tion—held that those cases authorized warrantless tracking of any vehicle in a
public place.105 If courts now apply Davis to hold that Knotts and Karo
“expressly authorized” warrantless tracking—despite the insistence by the
Jones Court that they did no such thing—then Jones itself will have little
impact.
But I am doubtful that any court would so hold. It is clear that the circuit
opinions applying Knotts and Karo to GPS tracking expressly authorized it. No
doubt about that. But it is hard for me to see, after Jones, any lower court
holding that Knotts and Karo themselves expressly authorized GPS tracking as
well. Such a holding would be directly contrary to Jones.
C. DOJ Strategy After Jones: High Stakes and the Coming Splits
1. Pushing the Limits of Davis
The government’s strategy is already evident. It will defend warrantless
tracker suppression claims by invoking Davis.106 The government’s strategy
throws into stark relief the interpretive dichotomy (prohibited-unless-permitted
vs. permitted-unless-prohibited) sketched above. For example, in United States
v. Robinson, the tracking was done in Missouri, part of the Eighth Circuit,
use of a GPS device should not be suppressed and that the use of a GPS device was lawful
under both United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010) and Davis v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (2011), because “placement of the GPS device and the
subsequent monitoring was done in reasonable reliance on then binding appellate
precedent.”).
105 See, e.g., United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272 (2011), vacated 132 S. Ct. 1534
(2012) (vacated and remanded “in light of United States v. Jones.”).
106 See, e.g., Government’s Request for Supplemental Briefing on Defendant’s Motion to
Suppress GPS Tracking Evidence at 2–3, United States v. Robinson, 4:11-cr-00361-AGF
(E.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2012), ECF No. 49.
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which had no tracker caselaw. Nevertheless, the government argued that the
evidence should still shelter under Davis because other circuits had held that
tracker use was not a search, and because no circuit had yet held that it was a
search:
In the instant case, in attaching the GPS tracker to defendant’s automobile without a
warrant, and tracking the automobile’s movements through use of the GPS tracker,
the agents relied upon and strictly adhered to then controlling appellate court opin-
ions that addressed the specific issue and which had found no requirement for a court
ordered warrant. See[ ] United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996–98 (7th Cir.
2007); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Pineda-Morena, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010). At the time the agents here
utilized the GPS tracker on defendant’s automobile, the government was unaware of
any appellate court that had determined that a warrant was required to place such a
tracker on a vehicle. Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit can be found to have ratified
the agents’ conduct here in a case with markedly similar underlying facts, United
States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010), following and applying the logic of
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in finding that a warrant was not required for the
placement and use of a GPS tracker. See also[ ] United States v. Hernandez, 647
F.3d 216, 220 n.4 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 273
(7th Cir. 2011). The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinions under-
lying Jones and which found a warrant requirement, United States v. Maynard, 615
F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010) and United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
were not issued until approximately seven months after the agents here had installed
the GPS tracker. Thus, it is the government’s position, relying upon Davis, supra,
that the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Jones does not require the exclusion of
the GPS tracking evidence in the instant case. The agents here acted reasonably and
responsibly, and with the good faith belief that their conduct was lawful, and there is
no need to deter their innocent conduct through application of the exclusionary
rule.107
The argument shows considerable chutzpah. First, it asserts that Davis’s “bind-
ing appellate precedent” language should be read to include other circuits’
caselaw—that caselaw from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits should be treated
as “binding appellate caselaw” in the Eighth Circuit! This is an extraordinary
claim, and the government cites no authority for the proposition that Seventh
and Ninth Circuit cases are binding in the Eighth Circuit. There are, of course,
no such authorities. Circuit caselaw is binding only within the circuit. So is the
government suggesting that when Davis said “binding appellate caselaw” it just
meant “binding appellate caselaw somewhere”? Apparently, it is. I don’t know
how else to read the government’s claim that agents in Missouri, in the Eighth
Circuit, relied on “then-controlling appellate opinions” from the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits.
The idea that officers can rely on out-of-circuit caselaw is part of qualified
immunity doctrine; the Supreme Court said so in Pearson v. Callahan.108 The
Court explained that although the Tenth Circuit had not yet ruled on the legality
of the search in question, every circuit that had ruled on such a search had
approved it: “The officers here were entitled to rely on these cases, even though
107 Id. (emphasis in original).
108 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 244–45 (2009).
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their own Federal Circuit had not yet ruled on ‘consent-once-removed’
entries.”109
But this is a Fourth Amendment suppression claim, not a qualified immu-
nity claim, and no legal authority has ever held that the Davis “express authori-
zation” standard should be read as identical to the qualified immunity standard.
Nor, to my knowledge, has the government expressly argued for such equiva-
lence. Perhaps prosecutors agree with me that that argument is too much for the
language, posture, and facts of Davis to bear. Without that argument, though,
the government’s discussion of Davis seems quite tenuous. In its Robinson
pleadings, the government begins its discussion of Davis by acknowledging
that Marquez, the Eighth Circuit case authorizing warrantless tracking, was not
decided until after the tracking had been done. The government then makes the
rather amazing argument that good faith should still apply because the subse-
quent Marquez holding reflected a “view” of the law that was shared by the
agents. Here’s the full argument:
However, a review of Marquez certainly gives a clear understanding of the view of
the applicable law in the Eighth Circuit at the time the GPS tracker was utilized in
this case. It might not have been the “law” of the land, but it gives this Court an
understanding of the “lay” of the land in the Eighth Circuit at the pertinent time, and
it is consistent with the previously cited cases from the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits.110
The pleading then repeats the passage cited above, arguing that the out-of-
circuit caselaw should be good enough for Davis purposes.111 In my view, the
argument that an agent in one circuit could claim “good-faith reliance” on
caselaw from another circuit is not colorable. Nor is the government’s proposal
that the Eighth Circuit “ratified” the agents’ conduct by later deciding that GPS
tracking was not a search. I cannot imagine that any court, on Robinson-type
facts, would hold that the tracking was “expressly authorized,” or that there’s
some sort of brand-new “ratification” exception to the exclusionary rule.
But the second argument in the Robinson motion is where the real action
is. Here the government picks up on the suggestion by Professor Tomkovicz et
al. that the Court may be moving toward aligning the good-faith test with the
qualified-immunity test. Though the government (carefully?) does not mention
qualified immunity, it suggests that “no one had said we couldn’t do it” should
be a viable Fourth Amendment defense: “At the time the agents here utilized
the GPS tracker on defendant’s automobile, the government was unaware of
any appellate court that had determined that a warrant was required to place
such a tracker on a vehicle.”112
That’s swinging for the fences: the government is asking the court to apply
the good-faith exception to police conduct that had not been expressly author-
109 Id. at 244.
110 Government’s Response to Defendant’s Objections to the Magistrate’s Report and Rec-
ommendation at 6, United States v. Robinson, No. 4:11-cr-00361-AGF (E.D. Mo. Feb. 13,
2012), ECF No. 53.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 9. In October 2012, the court ruled consistent with the predictions of this Article.
Order at 2, United States v. Robinson, No. 4:11-cr-00361-AGF (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 2012),
ECF No. 148.
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ized by the governing appellate court, on the grounds that it hadn’t yet been
expressly prohibited. As the government is presumably well aware, if courts
buy this one, then Jones will have virtually no effect on any evidence obtained
by warrantless tracker searches before January 23, 2012, no matter when the
cases are ultimately charged and tried.
2. Early Signals from District Courts
As of May 2012, eight district courts have ruled on motions to suppress
pre-Jones tracker evidence in the face of Davis arguments made by the govern-
ment. Five of those courts are in the Ninth Circuit, where the answer is easy:
binding appellate authority from the Ninth Circuit had held that GPS tracking
was not a search, so Davis applies.113 One court (N.D. Iowa) is in the Eighth
Circuit,114 but unlike the Robinson case discussed above, the tracking was done
after the Eighth Circuit had held in Marquez that GPS tracking was not a
search. So there too the answer was easy: Davis applies.
One court (E.D. Mich.) is in the Sixth Circuit,115 which had no tracker
caselaw, and the court avoided the Davis question, deciding the motion on
standing and inevitable discovery grounds. The court, however, came right out
and said that if it had to decide the Davis issue, it would accept the govern-
ment’s permitted-unless-prohibited theory.116
Finally, one court (E.D. Pa.) is in the Third Circuit,117 which also had no
tracker caselaw, and squarely decided the Davis question along precisely the
lines I have argued for herein: absence of caselaw is not express authorization,
so Davis does not apply.
These three decisions are illustrative of the choices facing district courts,
and the questions the circuits will need to decide.
a. Unwarranted Extensions of Davis
In my view, two of the district courts erroneously accepted the govern-
ment’s argument that Davis shelter should apply whenever no binding caselaw
had prohibited the practice. As explained above, that is not what Davis says,
and as explained below, that is a bad rule both theoretically and practically. It
113 United States v. Fata, No. 2:11-cr-00188-RLH, 2012 WL 1716207 at *1 (D. Nev. May
14, 2012) (order adopting Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge,
United States v. Fata, No. 2:11-cr-00188-RLH, 2012 WL 1715496 at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 15,
2012)); United States v. Aquilar, No. 4:11-cr-298-BLW, 2012 WL 1600276 at *2 (D. Idaho
May 7, 2012); United States v. Heath, No. CR 12-4-H-DWM, 2012 WL 1574123 at *1 (D.
Mont. May 3, 2012); United States v. Leon, No. CR 09-00452 JMS, 2012 WL 1081962 at *5
(D. Haw. Mar. 28, 2012); United States v. Nwobi, No. CR 10-952(C) GHK-7, 2012 WL
769746 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2012).
114 United States v. Amaya, No. CR 11-4065-MWB, 2012 WL 1188456 at *5 (N.D. Iowa
Apr. 10, 2012) opinion withdrawn in part on reconsideration, 2012 WL 1523045 at *2
(N.D. Iowa May 1, 2012).
115 See United States v. Luna-Santillanes, No. 11-20492, 2012 WL 1019601 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 26, 2012).
116 Id. at *9 n.5. Though obviously dicta from a district court means relatively little. And
one of the district courts in the Ninth Circuit also accepted the permitted-unless-prohibited
theory on the issue of monitoring as opposed to installing trackers. Leon, 2012 WL
1081962, at *5.
117 United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL 1646894 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012).
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will be important for the circuits to scrutinize such rulings carefully when they
come up on appeal—my primary goal here is to provide assistance to the cir-
cuits in that task.
i. Eastern District of Michigan: United States v. Luna-
Santillanes
In Luna-Santillanes, the court avoided taking on the Davis argument
directly but stated in a footnote that if the issue arose it would give Davis
shelter in the face of circuit silence:
In light of the Court’s decision, it is unnecessary to consider the government’s addi-
tional argument that, because the use of a GPS device on a vehicle without first
obtaining a search warrant was a widely-accepted practice in the police community
that had not been held unconstitutional by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply. If this Court were to
consider this additional argument, it would find it persuasive. As the United States
Supreme Court recently held in United States v. Davis, “[b]ecause suppression would
do nothing to deter police misconduct in these circumstances, . . . searches conducted
in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to
the exclusionary rule.”118
I hope that any lawyer will see what’s wrong with the court’s reasoning
here. The error—to my mind, at any rate—is plain: only the second half of the
quotation (the part following the ellipsis) is the holding of Davis. And that
holding obviously cannot apply in a circuit that had no binding appellate prece-
dent on the conduct at issue. The government’s argument that warrantless GPS
tracking “was a widely-accepted practice in the police community that had not
been held unconstitutional by the Sixth Circuit” is a non sequitur, because
Davis simply did not hold that widely accepted practices that had not yet been
held unconstitutional are entitled to good-faith shelter. “You never told me I
couldn’t” is just not the same thing as “you expressly told me I could.” The
district court seems to miss—or worse, to deny?—the difference. I doubt such
reasoning would prevail in an appellate court or in the Supreme Court.119
ii. District of Hawaii: United States v. Leon120
The district court in the fortuitously captioned Leon made the same error.
In Leon, the good faith issue arose because the court separated, in its analysis,
the installation of the tracker and the monitoring of the tracker. The court held
that Davis shelter applied to the installation because warrantless installation of
trackers “was specifically authorized by binding Ninth Circuit precedent—
United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 ([9th Cir.] 1999).”121 As to long-term
monitoring of the tracker, the Ninth Circuit had endorsed that too, in United
States v. Pineda–Moreno.122 But the monitoring in Leon had taken place
before Pineda-Moreno was decided. So as to the monitoring, the district court
118 Luna-Santillanes, 2012 WL 1019601, at *9 n.5 (citation omitted).
119 Which is not to say that the Supreme Court might not eventually announce such a hold-
ing. It could, of course—but it would be a new holding; it is not the holding of Davis.
120 Leon, 2012 WL 1081962.
121 Id. at *4.
122 United States v. Pineda–Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1215 (9th Cir. 2010).
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treated the situation as one of appellate-court silence—but applied Davis
anyway:
Prior to 2009, only one circuit court addressed the constitutionality of GPS mon-
itoring. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007), largely relying on
Knotts, held that the use of the GPS device did not implicate the Fourth Amend-
ment. . . . In contrast, as of 2009, no circuit court had held that the prolonged use of a
GPS device to be [sic] unconstitutional.
Given the state of the law in 2009, the evidence clearly establishes that the DEA
agents did not “exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth
Amendment rights.” Instead, they acted with an objectively reasonable good-faith
belief that their conduct was fully compliant with then-existing Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.123
The court’s assertions are true but irrelevant, just as the Luna-Santillanes
court’s were. It is true that the agents did not intend to violate the suspect’s
Fourth Amendment rights and that they reasonably thought that warrantless
GPS tracking was consistent with existing Fourth Amendment law. (I thought
so too. I gave agents that exact advice; everyone did, right up until January 24,
2012.) But, like the Luna-Santillanes court, the Leon court conflates an agent’s
reasonable interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in the face of judicial
silence with the actual Davis threshold—express approval by binding appellate
precedent.
The Leon court also mentions the “post-hoc ratification” argument dis-
cussed above, and while not explicitly adopting it, gives it warm regards:
And although not directly relevant to the agents’ objectively reasonable good-
faith belief as of 2009, three judges of the Ninth Circuit found the prolonged use of a
GPS tracking device constitutional in 2010. United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591
F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010). And in doing so, the court relied almost exclusively on
Knotts. This after-the-fact ruling provides further support that the agents acted with
an objectively reasonable good-faith belief—a court would be hard-pressed to place
culpability on the agents for their actions in 2009 when, one year later, three judges
of the Ninth Circuit relied on Knotts to conclude that the prolonged use of a GPS
tracking device did not violate the Fourth Amendment.124
I do not know any other way to say this: the district court’s analysis has no
basis in existing doctrine. While the district court may think that the underlying
spirit of Davis is to give good-faith shelter whenever an agent did not specifi-
cally intend to violate the Fourth Amendment, that’s not what Davis held. An
officer’s reasonable belief that his conduct is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment is just not the same as prior express authorization of that conduct
by binding appellate precedent. The Leon court, like the Luna-Santillanes
court, ignores the difference. I doubt future circuit panels will.
iii. Eastern District of Pennsylvania: United States v.
Katzin125
The first district court decision I have seen to reject the “silence = shelter”
Davis argument is Katzin, from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The court
123 Leon, 2012 WL 1081962, at *5 (some internal citations omitted).
124 Id.
125 United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL 1646894 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 2012).
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held that express authorization is different from silence, and that only express
authorization triggers Davis shelter.126 The court began by noting that at the
time of the tracking, its own Third Circuit was silent on the matter, and there
was a split among the circuits.127 The court then acknowledged the Leon and
Luna-Santillanes decisions discussed above, and explained why it was not per-
suaded to follow them:
Certainly an argument could be made—and the Government in this case clearly
makes it—that the more general good faith exception language found in Davis and
other similar cases would allow for an individualized determination of whether the
officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in each specific case.
However, to move beyond the strict Davis holding sharpens the instruments that
can effectively eviscerate the exclusionary rule entirely. In this case, at the time the
GPS device was placed on the Dodge Caravan there were four circuit courts of
appeals that arguably could have supported the Government’s conduct and one that
would not have, meaning that fewer than half of the circuits had even weighed in on
the question. If law enforcement is permitted to rely on authority from a minority of
other circuits to support the constitutionality of its investigatory practices, where does
a district court draw the line when binding precedent later renders those practices
unconstitutional? Is law enforcement reliance on a significant minority or, somewhat
better, a bare majority of circuits to have addressed the topic enough, or is an over-
whelming majority, if not unanimity, required? Does it matter which circuits (or
which panels in which circuits) support or condemn the investigatory practice? Does
it matter how many circuits have squarely addressed the issue? The difficulty
presented by the dilemma ought to be manifest.128
I agree. And so, I would argue, would the Davis majority itself. The
“express authorization” rule is easily administrable: you look at the governing
circuit court and see what it said. A “reasonable prediction based on out-of-
circuit caselaw” rule is not easily administrable—indeed, I would say it would
not be administrable at all.
Furthermore, said the Katzin court, the “silence = shelter” rule is bad con-
stitutional doctrine:
Extending Davis also would move law enforcement further from the solid
ground on which other good faith exceptions to the exclusionary rule stand. Those
exceptions generally involve reliance on unequivocally binding legal authority, see
Illinois v. Krull (good faith exception covers subsequently invalidated statutes);
United States v. Leon (law enforcement acted in good faith relying on a judicially
approved warrant later found to be improvidently granted) or isolated non-recurring
errors, see Herring v. United States. Essentially, in each of these cases, the mistake
was made by some other neutral branch of government, and not by law enforcement,
or else, as in Herring, was not the product of a conscious decision; neither of those
categories encompass the conduct in this case.129
And finally, it’s bad practical policy:
Other familiar policy issues persuade the Court that a Davis-like good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule should not be stretched to authorize the warrantless
GPS tracker here. The Supreme Court’s general language describing the exclusionary
126 Id. at *9–10.
127 Id. at *7.
128 Id. at *9 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
129 Id. (citations omitted).
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rule states that it applies in cases of “recurring or systemic negligence.” The risk of
institutionalizing a policy of permitting reliance on non-binding authority, particu-
larly in the face of other, contrary non-binding authority, at least borders on being
categorized as systemic negligence. Indeed, opening to the Government the shelter of
the good faith exception in this case would encourage law enforcement to beg for-
giveness rather than ask permission in ambiguous situations involving the basic civil
rights.130
The court’s concern nicely encapsulates the basic questions at the heart of the
good-faith doctrine: What incentives do we want to create for the police on the
constitutional borderlines of investigations? And do we want the courts to have
any role in creating and enforcing those incentives? As these early cases indi-
cate, there’s a circuit split brewing here, and the courts of appeals—and ulti-
mately the Supreme Court—will have to answer those questions directly.
D. Future Technologies
Jones is that rare Fourth Amendment case where the government put all
its marbles on the “not-a-search” argument and did not even raise possible
exceptions.131 So the Court actually reached the substantive Fourth Amend-
ment issue. But while it is true that police probably now need to get warrants to
place trackers on vehicles, and any warrantless-tracker evidence obtained after
January 23, 2012, will most likely be suppressed, when it comes to other new
technologies that may end up being litigated in the future, if the government
can consistently make and win the sort of “permitted-unless-prohibited” argu-
ments examined above, then the good-faith exception would always apply to
as-yet-unlitigated search contexts. And if the good-faith exception applies, then
courts do not need to (and thus you can be sure will not) reach the underlying
substantive question of whether the conduct violates the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, the stakes are pretty high here: it would be a very big deal if the “permit-
ted-until-expressly-prohibited” good-faith argument gains wide acceptance.
Consider some crazy new technology—a portable handheld scanner, say,
that can sense the infrared radiation emitted by a person’s body and display the
outline of any solid object inside the person’s clothing (for example, a gun) that
is obstructing that radiation.132 Assume that the device is highly reliable, so
that courts would uncontroversially agree that seeing a gun-shaped outline on
the display screen is probable cause to believe that the person is carrying a
concealed gun. Say some departments start buying units and deploying them at
random around the city. When they get a hit, they have probable cause, and
they arrest, search, and charge. The suppression question in such cases would
be simple: Was the random, suspicionless use of the scanner itself a
“search”?133 If so, everything is suppressed; if not, everything comes in.
130 Id. (citations omitted).
131 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951–53 (2012).
132 The New York City Police Department was testing such technology in January 2012.
See, e.g., Al Baker, Police Working on Technology to Detect Concealed Guns, N.Y. TIMES
BLOG (Jan. 17, 2012, 4:39 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/17/police-work-
ing-on-technology-to-detect-concealed-guns/?scp=1&sq=firearms%20detector&st=cse.
133 Cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that it is not a “search,” for
Fourth Amendment purposes, for a trained narcotics canine to screen luggage which is
located in a public place).
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So what do you do if you are a judge faced with this novel substantive
Fourth Amendment claim? You start to ponder it: well, on the one hand this is
sort of like Kyllo, isn’t it?134 It is a new technology, not in public use. It can
reveal contraband, but also perfectly legal stuff you’re trying to keep private—
and for goodness’ sake, it’s an infrared scanner, the exact same type of scanner
as in Kyllo!135
On the other hand, this defendant was walking on a public street, so we
surely have a diminished expectation of privacy as compared with Kyllo. Is
Kyllo really about the sanctity of the home? Do we have exactly the same sort
of privacy rights in the contents of our waistbands as we do in the contents of
our bedrooms?
And then the government cuts off your pondering with its good-faith argu-
ment: “Look, Your Honor, you don’t even need to reach the question of
whether this is a search because it is undisputed that this is a first-impression
issue. The defense doesn’t dispute the fact that there are no cases on portable
body scanners at all, and that, a fortiori, no case has ever prohibited their use
without a warrant. Thus, because there was no case prohibiting what the
officers did, the evidence should shelter under Davis and come in.”
As things stand right now, the defense could jump up and respond along
the lines sketched out in this article: “No, Your Honor, that is not at all what
Davis says. Davis says that good faith applies if the conduct in question was
expressly authorized by binding appellate caselaw. Now, we agree that there
are no cases at all on portable body scanners. And that means that, a fortiori,
there are no cases expressly authorizing their use without a warrant. Thus,
because there was no binding appellate authority expressly authorizing what the
officers did, the evidence cannot shelter under Davis. So, because there is no
good-faith claim available, this Court does have to reach the merits and decide
whether this is a search.”
So which will it be? The point of this Article is simple: if the government
wins that argument about the meaning of Davis, then there will never be a
ruling on whether the use of a new technology constitutes a “search.” On the
government’s argument, if it is new and untested, it is therefore sheltered by
Davis.
Professor Justin Marceau, writing just before Davis, articulated the prob-
lem well:
[S]ettled law permitting a particular police practice (search or seizure) could take on
a sort of stone-tablets character—qualified immunity would prevent a successful civil
action, and settled expectations and reasonable officer reliance would also preclude
exclusion, thus rendering a merits decision unnecessary in both domains. Just as fed-
eral courts balked at the Saucier [v. Katz] mandate that they decide the constitutional
question before addressing whether the law was clearly established for purposes of
qualified immunity if a broad reading of Herring [v. United States] ultimately
prevails—whether it is called “good faith” or simply a cost-benefit calculation—then
there will be no incentive, and certainly no mandate, for judges to revisit settled
134 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (finding that police performed a “search,”
for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, when they used a thermal imager to gain infor-
mation about activity within a home).
135 Id. at 29.
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questions of Fourth Amendment law. The problem of missing Fourth Amendment
merits decisions could quickly become acute.136
So if it is an important part of our constitutional order that courts get a
chance to make these core constitutional rulings on rapidly evolving law
enforcement technology, then Davis should be construed narrowly, to only
shelter expressly authorized techniques.
This argument can be made at three different levels: the more abstract
policy level of the preceding paragraph; the creative “deterrence of appellate-
judge error” level as attempted by Professor Orin Kerr in Davis;137 or, most
intuitively, at the street level of deterrence of bad police behavior. I argue sim-
ply that for Fourth Amendment purposes, the warrantless use of new investiga-
tive technologies that have never been ruled on by the courts is exactly the sort
of police behavior that the Fourth Amendment is intended to deter.
E. Is There Any Guidance from Pre-Kyllo Thermal Imaging Evidence After
Kyllo?
One might expect to find some interesting parallels in the post-Kyllo liti-
gation over warrantless thermal imaging scans. I have not, however, found any
case in which the thermal imaging evidence was introduced directly, as
opposed to serving as probable cause for a warrant application. The reason is
obvious: the only value of thermal imaging is to determine whether there is
likely a “marijuana grow” in a house, so there would of course have to be a
warrant to go in and find the marijuana. (GPS evidence about movements,
though, will have its own evidentiary value and may well be introduced
directly.) Thus, it does not appear that the government ever sought to simply
admit the warrantless thermal imaging scan evidence itself. Rather, the thermal
imaging scan was always used as the basis for getting a warrant. The search
would then reveal the “marijuana grow” itself. Accordingly, the only post-
Kyllo good-faith caselaw on thermal imaging was ordinary Leon caselaw:138
the police had gotten a warrant that was facially valid, issued by a magistrate,
and based on probable cause. A reasonable officer could rely on the warrant;
end of story.
A 2003 Seventh Circuit decision is illustrative:
Thus, to the extent that any actor can be said to have been at fault, it was not the
officers who sought, obtained, and executed the warrant, but rather the magistrate
who, lacking the requisite prescience (not to mention authority, given Myers) to
declare the unconstitutionality of the scan, relied on the then-controlling precedent to
deny its issuance. On the other hand, the belief of an officer—warrant-in-hand—that
probable cause existed to search Acker’s residence was entirely reasona-
ble. . . . [L]aw enforcement agents properly left the probable cause determination,
and its attendant constitutional and precedential considerations, to the better judg-
ment of the magistrate. . . . [A]ny error that is said to have occurred must be attrib-
136 Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV. 687,
747–48 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
137 Brief for Petitioner at 37–39, Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (No. 09-
11328), 2010 WL 5168874 at *37–39.
138 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (insulating reliance on facially valid
warrants).
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uted to the magistrate, and not law enforcement agents, for the former was in a
relatively better position to divine the as-yet unannounced unconstitutionality of the
thermal imaging scan. Second, the candor of police with respect to the scan precludes
a court’s refusal to apply the good-faith exception on the basis of police dishonesty or
recklessness before the issuing magistrate, the first of the four enumerated situations
in which the exception will not apply. Both points highlight the reality that exclusion
of the challenged evidence would not adequately advance the purpose of deterring
police misconduct, but rather would penalize police for magistral mistake.139
So the magistrate issued a warrant that was valid under then-controlling
caselaw. And indeed the Seventh Circuit had a 1995 case that had expressly
held that warrantless thermal imaging was not a search.140
And the Seventh Circuit was not alone. The Ninth Circuit Kyllo panel had
pointed to the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits for the proposition
that thermal imaging was not a search.141 Likewise, the Sixth Circuit, which
had no pre-Kyllo thermal imaging precedent, suggested post-Kyllo that the key
point was that the magistrate had issued a warrant that an officer was entitled to
rely on.142
Nor can we glean anything from the post-remand history of Kyllo itself. It
might have seemed a good vehicle for the government to pursue a good-faith
claim. But the Kyllo docket indicates that the U.S. Attorney’s office decided
there was no point trying to squeeze any more blood from the stone. After the
Supreme Court’s decision, the government moved to dismiss.143
So Kyllo doesn’t help much in predicting what will happen to tracker
cases after Jones. It is clear that where the tracker evidence was used to secure
a warrant, the familiar Leon analysis will apply. But where there was no war-
rant—pure Davis claims—we are on terra nova. I think the framework I have
set forth in this article is the best guide to what is likely to happen.
VII. CODA: CIVIL DAMAGES AS AN ALTERNATIVE? QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
AFTER PEARSON V. CALLAHAN
As Professor Kerr argued unsuccessfully in Davis, the utility of the sup-
pression remedy is not solely in deterring bad police behavior. It has another,
perhaps equally significant, jurisprudential function: getting Fourth Amend-
ment claims in front of courts in the first place. As Kerr has argued for the past
decade, of all the provisions within the Bill of Rights, the Fourth Amendment is
the most sensitive to technological development, and thus the most in need of
139 United States v. 15324 Cnty. Highway E., 332 F.3d 1070, 1075–76 (7th Cir. 2003)
(footnote omitted).
140 United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1995).
141 United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v.
Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1995); Myers, 46 F.3d at 669; United States v. Ishmael,
48 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1059 (8th Cir.
1994)).
142 United States v. Jarrell, 68 F. App’x 622, 626 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Jarrell argues that
because there was a split in the circuit courts regarding use of thermal imaging at the time
the warrant was issued, Agent Watters’s reliance on the warrant, which included the thermal
imaging, was not made in good faith. The Court disagrees.”).
143 See Mot. to Dismiss by Government, United States v. Kyllo, No. 3:92CR00051 (D. Or.
Sept. 25, 2001), ECF No. 210.
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continual judicial re-evaluation by the courts as the technological balance in the
cops-and-robbers arms race shifts and as society’s privacy expectations and the
collateral damage thereto shift as well.144 And the only way to get Fourth
Amendment doctrine in front of courts is through suppression claims.145 At
argument in Davis, Professor Kerr made the prescient but unfortunately
doomed argument that the practical impact of the Court’s new good-faith rule
will be to chill much pre-trial Fourth Amendment litigation and thus stymie the
development of Fourth Amendment law.146
The Court, however, seemed disappointingly comfortable with the
assumption that there are alternative mechanisms, besides suppression, for
ensuring lawful police conduct.147 In recent years, starting perhaps with Hud-
son v. Michigan (no suppression for knock-and-announce violations),148 the
meme that “there are other deterrents out there” has been a popular one in the
Court’s Fourth Amendment cases.149 It remains to be seen, however, whether
those other deterrents can bear scrutiny as viable alternatives to suppression.
The § 1983 plaintiffs’ bar has been regularly invoked as a substitute for
suppression.150 But in damages cases, the application of Davis to Jones claims
highlights the pernicious effects of a significant but underreported decision
from two terms ago: Pearson v. Callahan.151
In Pearson, federal agents entered Pearson’s home without a warrant to
search for drugs.152 The asserted justification was that a cooperating informant,
whom Pearson had invited into his house (to make the purchase), could then
invite in the police.153 Pearson sued for damages.154 The Tenth Circuit had not
yet ruled on this “consent-once-removed” doctrine as it applied to informants,
though other circuits had.155 The prevailing rule in § 1983 cases, per Saucier v.
Katz, was that the court had to decide the substantive constitutional question
first, before deciding whether the rule was clearly established.156 The whole
point of the Saucier rule was to avoid the constitutional “stagnation” that would
144 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357,
364–65, 401 (2003).
145 Indeed, as Kerr himself has forcefully argued recently in the context of computer
searches, no Fourth Amendment claim should be deemed ripe until there has been an actual
search producing actual evidence. See, e.g., Brief for Professor Orin S. Kerr as Amicus
Curiae Supporting the Appellant in Favor of Reversal at 2–3, In re Applications of the
United States of America For Historical Cell-Site Data, No. 11-20884 (5th Cir. Feb. 22,
2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Kerr-Amicus-No-
11-20884.pdf.
146 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–17, Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419
(2012) (No. 09-11328), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument
_transcripts/09-11328.pdf; see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2433.
147 Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423–24.
148 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006).
149 See, e.g., id.
150 See id. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
152 Id. at 227.
153 Id. at 229.
154 Id. at 227.
155 Id. at 229–30.
156 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
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ensue if courts could avoid deciding constitutional questions solely on the
ground that the law was unsettled and thus qualified immunity applied.157
So the lower court ruled that the “consent-once-removed” doctrine was
unconstitutional (under Georgia v. Randolph).158 When the case reached the
Supreme Court, the Court decided it had had enough of the Saucier rule, and it
held that the “substantive-question-first” procedure would no longer be
mandatory. For unsettled areas of law, courts will be free to simply grant quali-
fied immunity without ever reaching the underlying constitutional question.
The Court dismissed the concern that doing away with the Saucier rule
would result in constitutional stagnation. Indeed, the Court specifically cited
suppression litigation in criminal cases as an alternative vehicle for develop-
ment of Fourth Amendment law!
[T]he development of constitutional law is by no means entirely dependent on cases
in which the defendant may seek qualified immunity. Most of the constitutional
issues that are presented in § 1983 damages actions and Bivens cases also arise in
cases in which that defense is not available, such as criminal cases and § 1983 cases
against a municipality, as well as § 1983 cases against individuals where injunctive
relief is sought instead of or in addition to damages. See [Cnty. of Sacramento v.]
Lewis (noting that qualified immunity is unavailable “in a suit to enjoin future con-
duct, in an action against a municipality, or in litigating a suppression motion.”).159
This comment in Pearson is another reason why lower courts—and the
Supreme Court itself, when the question comes to it—should not read Davis as
establishing a qualified-immunity standard for the good-faith exception: the
Court itself has recognized that suppression claims are the primary mechanism
for the development of Fourth Amendment law. If suppression is now ruled out
absent an express appellate prohibition of a particular practice, there will be no
viable mechanism by which Fourth Amendment law can evolve to keep pace
with technology.
Fourth Amendment violations are already categorically excluded as
habeas grounds, for starters, so post-conviction collateral challenges are out.160
The only litigation option left is § 1983 damages claims by innocent people
harmed by new technological surveillance, for example: warrantless GPS
tracker searches.
And it is in such claims that the pernicious impact of Pearson will be most
clearly felt. Take a simple hypothetical: say the police decide, on whatever
grounds, to place trackers on a number of vehicles as part of a conspiracy
investigation. Some of the leads pan out and charges are filed. The probable
cause narrative in the indictment lays out all the cars tracked and where they
went. One of those cars is our plaintiff’s. He is a prominent public figure, and
the filing of indictment generates great publicity when the media sees that he
was one of the targets. He is never charged with any crime, but the revelations
157 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
158 Callahan v. Millard Cnty., 494 F.3d 891, 902–03 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Georgia v.
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (holding that one cotenant cannot consent to search over the
objections of another on-scene tenant)).
159 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242–43 (citations omitted).
160 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 480 (1976).
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about where he was spending his time are reported in the media, and he suffers
significant harms in his personal and professional life.
You can fill in whatever prurient details you want. The point is this can
easily happen. Here you have a guy who was illegally searched, and the illegal
search caused him damages. Isn’t that a cause of action? Sure, but the cops’
defense is qualified immunity. Prior to Pearson, the required analysis was the
“Saucier two-step.”161 The court had to decide first whether there was a consti-
tutional violation, and only then, if there was, whether the law was clearly
established. Under Saucier, the law would evolve—even if the cops in this case
were off the hook, the rule would be clearly established for the next case
because the court would have to decide the substance first.
But Pearson threw out the two-step rule, and held that courts could decide
the “clearly-established” question first, if they chose.162 As commentators have
pointed out—and as the Court was aware—this change will have the same side
effect as Davis: freezing the constitutional landscape in place because no new
constitutional claims can ever be recognized.163 The virtue of the Saucier two-
step was the same as the exclusionary rule: it forced courts to actually adjudi-
cate constitutional claims in novel factual settings. A Saucier ruling finding a
violation but granting qualified immunity on the second prong still made law,
though the plaintiff himself wouldn’t recover, because once step one was
decided (“this conduct violates the Constitution”) the law becomes clearly
established, so that future violators won’t have immunity. But if step one never
gets decided then gray areas remain forever gray, and violators remain forever
immune.
It is a perfect Catch-22: under Pearson, courts can refrain from deciding
the constitutional question simply because they have not yet decided the consti-
tutional question. Under the Saucier rule, litigants (and perhaps more impor-
tantly, good lawyers) have an incentive to bring § 1983 claims in novel settings
because even if they don’t get damages they can move the law. Not anymore,
under Pearson.
Now, of course, in Jones, the Court did decide the constitutional ques-
tion.164 But what about future Fourth Amendment claims involving established
police conduct that, because of technological changes, comes to have new and
pernicious privacy impacts? This is exactly what Justice Sotomayor is talking
about in her concurrence: the government’s ability to store, forever, and in
readily searchable format, a lifetime’s worth of data on everyone in the country,
should make us re-think, she argued, the Smith “pen-register” rule that a person
161 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.
162 Id. at 236.
163 See, e.g., Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and
the Articulation of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 428 n.121 (2009);
Goutam U. Jois, Pearson, Iqbal, and Procedural Judicial Activism, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
901, 924 (2010).
164 The government had not made the good faith argument or any other arguments below,
other than the “not-a-search” argument, so the Court held all other arguments forfeited.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012). Practice lesson: it never hurts to throw on
a belt as well as the suspenders.
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categorically forfeits any privacy claim in information voluntarily disclosed to
a third person.165
Okay, fair enough. But how do we re-think it? Well, before Davis and
Pearson, we could re-think it in two ways. Criminal defendants could argue
suppression claims, and civil plaintiffs could sue for damages. But under Davis
and Pearson, both of those routes are wiped out. There is nothing to litigate in
a criminal case if there is no suppression remedy, and there is no suppression
remedy under Davis if existing caselaw authorizes the practice.166 And civil
plaintiffs are out of luck because whenever the facts are sufficiently novel to
support a claim that a given practice outruns existing Fourth Amendment
authorization, there will, by definition, be qualified immunity.167
Perhaps some sort of civil remedy can be coaxed into life from the ashes
of Saucier. For example, Professor James Pfander has proposed allowing con-
stitutional tort claims for nominal damages as a compromise of sorts. There is
no need for qualified immunity, he argues, if there is no threat of personal
monetary liability.168 Thus, the socially beneficial effects of the Saucier two-
step could be realized. The merits could still be reached, and the law could still
evolve.
By expressly declaring in the complaint that they do not intend to seek and will not
accept any compensatory or punitive damages or an award of costs and attorney’s
fees (and thereby confining themselves to nominal damages alone), plaintiffs would
waive the money damages aspect of constitutional tort litigation that threatens offi-
cial defendants with personal liability. By removing the threat of personal liability,
and with it much of the justification for qualified immunity, the suit for nominal
damages would allow the plaintiff to secure a constitutional decision even where the
law was not clearly established.169
But that is just a proposal. Right now, there is no such rule, and all § 1983
plaintiffs are stuck with Pearson. The only hope, then, for continuing evolution
of Fourth Amendment doctrine lies in courts’ adopting a narrow reading of
Davis. Under a narrow reading, as articulated in this Essay, the “good-faith-
reliance-on-caselaw” exception will only apply when caselaw expressly autho-
rizes the precise police practice at issue. Where technological, procedural, or
societal changes have been interposed between the caselaw and the practice,
Davis will not apply. Only if courts adopt that narrow reading of Davis will the
Fourth Amendment continue to respond to technological change.
165 Id. at 956–57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
166 What do you bet that trial judges are going to use Davis as an analogue to Pearson, too
(deciding the good-faith question precisely to avoid issuing a substantive Fourth Amend-
ment ruling)?
167 Qualified immunity obtained unless the police violated “clearly established” law—
which obviously there won’t be in a novel and contested area. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
168 James E. Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort
Claims for Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1601 (2011).
169 Id. at 1607–08 (footnotes omitted).
